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Italian Court of Cassation—war crimes—sovereign immunity—acta jure imperii—application of decisions
of the International Court of Justice
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALBERS. No. 32139. 95 Rivista di diritto internazionale 1196
(2012).
Corte di cassazione, August 9, 2012.
In August 2012, the First Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court or
Court), the highest Italian domestic court, issued a judgment upholdingGermany’s sovereign
immunity from civil claims brought by Italian war crime victims against Paul Albers and eight
others in the Italian courts (Albers).1 In so doing, the Court overruled its own earlier decisions
and also reversed the judgment of April 20, 2011, by the ItalianMilitaryCourt of Appeal (Mil-
itaryCourt),whichhadupheld suchclaims relating towar crimes committedbyGerman forces
in Italy duringWorldWar II.With this ruling, theCourt ofCassation put an end to its decade-
long effort to find an exception to the well-known rule of customary international law pro-
viding for sovereign immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction for acts jure imperii. This revire-
ment resulted from the Court’s decision to give effect to the judgment of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in Germany v. Italy.2
In Albers, the Court reviewed theMilitary Court’s 2011 decision upholding a first-instance
conviction of five of the accused—German citizens who were former members of the Schutz-
staffel (SS)—for war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in Italy during the final
months of WorldWar II.Germanyhad challenged the damages-related section of the dispositif
of that decision (the reparation order). TheMilitary Court dismissed Germany’s objection to
the exercise of civil jurisdiction, relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s 2004 judg-
ment in the Ferrini case.3
In that earlier case, the Court of Cassation had decided that the principle of state immunity
for acts jure imperii did not apply to claims for damages arising from war crimes. It had con-
cluded that the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of international crimes prevailed over the
customary international law rule of sovereign immunity. According to the Court, the para-
mount interest in preventing the most atrocious crimes necessarily trumps the concern of pre-
serving state sovereignty through immunity. Moreover, since most of the crimes in question
had taken place in Italy, the domestic tort exception applied. Under that doctrine, the non-
contractual tortious or delictual conduct of a state occurring in another state’s territory is sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the latter’s domestic courts.4 As later recalled inAlbers, this judgment
was based on a fortunate (and alleged) “convergence of the criteria based on the nonderogable
nature of jus cogens and on the so-called tort exception principle” (p. 1198).
1 Criminal Proceedings Against Albers, Cass., sez. un. pen., 9 agosto 2012, n. 32139, 95 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE [RDI] 1196 (2012), INT’L L.DOMESTICCTS. [ILDC] 1921 (in Ital.). All citations to the judg-
ment in this report are to the version in RDI. Translations of this and other Italian cases herein are by the author
unless otherwise noted.
2 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening) (Int’l Ct. Justice Feb. 3. 2012), at http://
icj-cij.org [hereinafter Germany v. Italy] (reported by Alexander Orakhelashvili at 106 AJIL 609 (2012)).
3 Ferrini v. Repubblica federale diGermania, Cass., sez. un., 11marzo 2004, n. 5044, 87RDI 539 (2004), trans-
lated in 128 ILR 658 (reported by Andrea Bianchi at 99 AJIL 242 (2005)).
4 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, GA Res.
59/38, annex, Art. 12 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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Ferrini was followed and applied by the Court of Cassation in several subsequent decisions.
In2008, for example, it confirmed thepower of lower Italian courts to exercise civil jurisdiction
against Germany in similar cases,5 on the grounds that it would be unreasonable to disallow
jurisdiction over the commission of those crimes which “mark the breaking point of the tol-
erable exercise of state sovereignty” (p. 1202).6 It noted “that [its decision] would contribute
to the emergence of a rule shaping the immunity of foreign states. Such a rule, in any event, is
already embedded in the international legal order” (id.).7 In a subsequent decision, Milde, the
Court went so far as to deviate expressly from the traditional method of inferring custom from
a record of widespread state practice.8 It held that a “qualitative” assessment is at times pref-
erable to an “arithmetical calculation,”9 in light of the difficulty inherent in verifying both the
existence of certain customs and their hierarchical positionwithin the systemof principles gen-
erally accepted by the international community.
Finally, in 2011, the Court of Cassation upheld the Florence Court of Appeal’s decision
authorizing the enforcement of a Greek tribunal’s ruling against Germany.10 In the judgment
submitted to theCourt ofAppeal for exequatur, theTribunal of Leivadia hadorderedGermany
to pay compensation for war crimes to private individuals. Germany argued that the enforce-
ment of this judgment was precluded under the relevant safeguards in Italian and European
Unionprivate international lawprohibiting recognitionof foreign judgments contrary to ordre
public.11Germany also noted that foreign jurisdictions had not endorsed theFerrini approach.
The Court of Cassation responded that foreign decisions did not contravene Ferrini, at least
inasmuch as the territorial link (locus commissi delicti) was used to assert jurisdiction. It then
offered a lofty panegyric onhow international lawhad evolved sinceWorldWar II, strenuously
supporting the rule in Ferrini with a handful of diverse precedents, and rejected Germany’s
appeal: “Such a rule is already implicit in the international legal system, which elevates the pro-
tection of inviolable human rights—on account of its axiological nature as a ‘meta-value’—to
the level of a fundamental principle, to whose emergence the Ferrini judgmentmakes a self-con-
scious contribution.”12
In its 2011 Albers decision, the Military Court adhered to the core arguments of the Court
of Cassation’s earlier decisions. Additionally, it expanded on the assumptions that customary
5 Cass., sez. un., 29 maggio 2008, n. 14199 (judgment); Cass., sez. un., 29 maggio 2008, nn. 14200–12 (13
orders).
6 Quoting Repubblica federale di Germania v.Mantelli, Cass., sez. un., 29maggio 2008, n. 14201, ILDC1037,
para. 11 (emphasis added) (in Ital.), quoted in Carlo Focarelli, Case Report: Federal Republic of Germany v.
Giovanni Mantelli and Others, 103 AJIL 122, 125 (2009).
7 Quoting Mantelli, ILDC 1037, para. 11, quoted in Focarelli at 125.
8 Criminal Proceedings Against Milde, Cass., I sez. pen., 13 gennaio 2009, n. 1072, 92 RDI 618 (2009), ILDC
1224 (in Ital.); cf.United States v. Tissino, Cass., sez. un., 25 febbraio 2009, n. 4461, ILDC1262 (in Ital.); Lozano
v. Italy, Cass., I sez. pen., 24 luglio 2008, n. 31171, para. 7, ILDC 1085 (in Ital.; partial Eng. trans.); Tigri Tamil,
Trib. Napoli, 29 gennaio 2012, at http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/Sentenza%20Guardiano%20
Tigri%20Tamil.pdf (all excluding applicationofFerriniprinciple to acts that donot amount to international crimes
or crimes against humanity).
9 Milde, para. 4.
10 Repubblica federale di Germania v. Prefettura Autonoma di Vojotia, Cass., I sez. civ., 20 maggio 2011, n.
11163, translated in ILDC 1815.
11 Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, Art. 64(1)(g); EC Regulation No. 44/2001, Art. 34(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 10.
12 Prefettura Autonoma di Vojotia, ILDC 1815, para. 30 (emphasis added).
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international law is evolutionary and that a balance must be struck between sovereign immu-
nity and the need to indemnify the victims of the gravest crimes. Giving preference to the pro-
hibition against international crimes (as lex superior) also furthered the progressive develop-
ment of customary international law, shaping a new exception (as lex specialis).
In February 2012, however, shortly before the Court of Cassation issued itsAlbers decision,
the ICJ delivered its judgment in Germany v. Italy. In that case, Italy had based its arguments
on the reasoning of the Ferrini-inspired case law: implementation of the peremptory rules
against international crimes cannot be frustratedby state immunity, especiallywhen the crimes
took place within the territory of the forum state. The ICJ rejected this defense and found Italy
in breach of international law for retaining claims against Germany in national courts and for
authorizing enforcement of Greek judgments violating Germany’s immunity. The ICJ held,
in short, that no territorial exception grants derogation from immunity on the basis of locus
commissi delicti; no evidence derived from general state practice and opinio juris indicates that
a new exception to customary law has emerged in that regard; the grant of immunity is inde-
pendent of the gravity of thewrongful act, evenwhen jus cogens is breached; andbecause immu-
nity operates at a procedural level and the prohibition of international crimes is a substantive
rule, a normative conflict between them cannot occur and all attempts to wield the lex superior
argument are misplaced.
Faced with the ICJ’s ruling, the Court of Cassation in Albers took due note of the dismissal
of Italy’s defense, which in effect demolished the pillars of the Ferrini case law. Nevertheless,
it contested some points of the ruling, in obiter dicta (p. 1204). Among them was the ICJ’s
statement that, in invoking jus cogens, Italy had allegedly overlooked that
[t]he rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining
whether or not the courts of one Statemay exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State.
They do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the
proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful.13
But according to the Italian Court, “It appears unduly restrictive to confine jus cogens rules
within their substantive scope, disregarding the fact that their practical effectiveness depends
precisely on the legal consequences of the violation of peremptory norms” (id.).
The Court also noted that the distinction between substantive rules of jus cogens and pro-
cedural rules on immunity as on two different levels promotes impunity, and fitting interna-
tional crimes in the jure imperii category provides them with undeserved protection. None-
theless, the Albers Court acknowledged the binding force of the ICJ’s decisions and the lack of
international support for its own conclusions. It accepted the ICJ’s clear message that no
wrongdoing by a state—no matter how grave—can erode its immunity. All the same, the
Court observed that the ICJ’s ruling, rather than representing a “highly plausible legal solu-
tion,” commanded compliance because of its inherent authority as a “dictum of the interna-
tional Judge” (pp. 1204–05). This remark, implicitly equating the ICJ’s judgment to a legal
source, formed the premise of a predictable distinction: the World Court’s decision must be
respected because it shapes the law ( jus), even if it does not reflect what is just ( justum): “[I]t
is not possible to find in the ICJ’s decision any arguments capable of refuting the persuasiveness
13 Germany v. Italy, supra note 2, para. 93.
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and legal solidity of the principles thus far affirmed by this Court” (p. 1205). The only accept-
able reason to surrender the Ferrini case law was, thus, the lack of “‘validation’ by the inter-
nationalCommunity ofwhich the ICJ is the highest judicial body” (id.).Ultimately, theCourt
acknowledged that its positionwas not (“yet”) sharedbyother states to a sufficient degree, “and
this ineluctable conclusion prevent[ed] further application [of the Ferrini principles]” (id.).
TheCourt ofCassation further observed that Italy had incurred international responsibility
for acts of its judiciary (the assertion of jurisdiction and concession of exequatur) and had been
ordered to restore the status quo ante. That order demanded compliance irrespective of the
means chosen to implement it and notwithstanding the legal finality of the domestic judg-
ments already delivered. Formally, the ICJ’s decision did not impose obligations directly on
the ItalianCourt, which, it argued, as amatter of domestic law enjoyed “total autonomy of the
jurisdictional function” (p. 1205). However, to avoid undermining Italy’s international posi-
tion, it resolved to implement the ICJ’s ruling and to issue a judgment reflecting the current
state of international law.
Therefore, theCourt of Cassation overturned theMilitaryCourt’s decision for lack of juris-
diction, and barred its remand. It also added a cursory remark excluding the possibility that
such a ruling would create an issue of constitutionality. This last passage is discussed below.
* * * *
In Albers, the Italian Court conceded defeat, recognizing that the ICJ’s judgment com-
manded respect and that the courts of other countries hadnot followed its lead,which strength-
ens the ICJ’s conclusion that no new custom had crystallized, before or after Ferrini. None-
theless, the Court took pains to claim (a symbolic) victory in terms of justice, casting itself as
the unappreciated genius. It is fair to say that this exercise of rationalization, slightly pathetic
at first glance, was necessary to make a strategic point: that the new rule of customary inter-
national law it favors has not yet emerged but could do so in the future. In asserting the validity
of the values of justice informing the supposed custom, theCourt carefully kept that hope alive
and denied that the evolutive process leading to the new rule had failed.
Even before the Court’s ruling in Albers, the ripples caused in the Italian judiciary’s pond
by the stone of the ICJ’s judgment had reached some lower courts. Specifically, proceedings
pending before the Tribunal of Florence and the Turin Court of Appeal had required them to
determine the impact of the ICJ’s decision in situations similar to those in Ferrini andAlbers.14
In both proceedings, a preliminary order had been obtained from the Court of Cassation en
banc, precisely on the possibility of exercising jurisdiction over Germany, as had been autho-
rized by the Court. This order posed a problem.On the one hand, issues settled by the Court’s
preliminary orders cannot be further disputed in the main proceedings. On the other, Article
94(1) of the United Nations Charter enjoins all UNmembers to comply with the ICJ’s judg-
ments, and that obligation enjoys quasi-constitutional status under Article 11 of the Italian
Constitution.TheFlorence tribunal acknowledged the superior rank of theCharter article and
accordingly set aside the norms on the finality of the Supreme Court’s rulings and asserted its
lack of jurisdiction. The Turin Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion by different rea-
soning. It noted that the ICJ’s decision could not overrule theCourt ofCassation’s preliminary
14 Manfredi v. Repubblica federale diGermania, Trib. Firenze, 28marzo 2012, 95RDI 583 (2012); Repubblica
federale di Germania v. De Guglielmo, App. Torino, 3 maggio 2012, id. at 916.
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pronouncement on jurisdiction, which was final and binding in the instant proceedings. Yet
the ICJ’s ruling had to be taken into account when “assessing the merits of the dispute.”15
Hence, it dismissed the claim on grounds of admissibility.
Both judgments illustrate how internal res judicata might be creatively overruled to give
effect to the ICJ’s decisions. But the need for such creative arguments was recently removed
by the legislature, which introduced a new norm into the Code of Civil Procedure that envis-
ages conflicts with an ICJ decision as a permissible ground for revocation of final judgments.16
Incidentally, a similar legislative solutionhadbeen adopted in the criminal field, after theEuro-
pean Court of Human Rights repeatedly condemned Italy for not allowing the reopening of
criminal trials conducted in violationof dueprocess standards. Initially, theCourt ofCassation
was forced to stretch analogic interpretation so as to apply the existing rules on revision if a
judgment fromStrasbourg ruled that the trial had been conducted in violation of theEuropean
Convention onHumanRights.17 The legislature later introduced a new ground for reopening
such a case when it had concluded with a sentence by the Court of Cassation.18
Moreover, the combined effect of the international rule—as identified by the ICJ—
and Article 10 of the Constitution, which calls for the automatic conformity of the Italian legal
order with international custom, requires judges to refuse recognition of foreign judgments violat-
ing state immunity. The cooperative stance displayed in Albers and by the Italian legislator
does justice to the ICJ’s rejection of Germany’s request for a nonrepetition order against
Italy.19
At least on the surface, theCourt ofCassation appeared to take the ICJ’s judgment seriously.
AlexanderOrakhelashvili concluded his critique of the ICJ’s decision in this Journal by observ-
ing that “[w]hether Italian authorities comply is for them to choose, but whether they are obli-
gated to do so is questionable.”20 They have in fact complied, and the Court seemingly felt an
obligation to do so—though itmayhave derived froma sense of Italy’s treaty obligations rather
than fromanynotionof judicial duties owed to theWorldCourt as a superior body.The Italian
Court did not attempt to shield itself behind the doctrine according to which states are unitary
subjects (“black-boxes”)21 whose inner components are irrelevant to (and immune from) the
obligations owed by the state under international law.
After all, the ICJ itself ordered Italy as a state to “ensure that the decisions of its courts and
thoseof other judicial authorities infringing [Germany’s immunity] cease tohave effect,”22 and
to redress all violations that had already occurred. This passage must be read in conjunction
with the statement that Italy would not escape its obligation simply because “some of the
15 De Guglielmo at 921 (emphasis added).
16 Legge14gennaio2013,n. 5,Art. 3(2) (ratifyingUnitedNationsConventionon the Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and Their Property, supra note 4).
17 See Somogyi, Cass., I sez. pen., 3 ottobre 2006, n. 32678; Cat Berro, Cass., V sez. pen., 2 febbraio 2007, n.
4395; Somogyi v. Italy, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 77.
18 See Art. 625 bis CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE. It will be applicable to those criminal proceedings, like
Albers and Milde, where the victims were admitted to bring a civil claim.
19 Germany v. Italy, supra note 2, para. 138.
20 Orakhelashvili, supra note 2, at 616.
21 Ward Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The International Obligation of State Organs, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 45 (2003).
22 Germany v. Italy, para. 139(4).
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violationsmayhave been committedby judicial organs, and someof the legal decisions in ques-
tion have become final in Italian domestic law.”23 In other words, Italy must ensure that
domestic courts reverse and discontinue, respectively, past and pending violations.24
Quite apart from the question whether all ICJ judgments can be considered directly appli-
cable in domestic courts (that is, are “self-executing”), this particular one clearly is because of
its clarity and completeness. Of course, Italy enjoys a certain “margin” in choosing the specific
means to implement its international obligations. But in Albers, the Court of Cassation
accepted its responsibility anddeclared its intent to contribute to Italy’s record as a law-abiding
citizen of the international community even before the legislator’s intervention. Granted, insofar
as the Court decided to follow the ICJ out of a sense of “comity” rather than obligation, themod-
eratemonismemanating fromAlbersmight easily revert todualism,withoutnotice.25But it ismore
likely that the Albers Court used the comity language to save face, not to reserve a right to rebel.
Furthermore, the legislator’s move dispelled all doubts about the genuineness of Italy’s sur-
render.
A certain parallel can be drawn with the Avena saga in the United States. The reluctance of
the U.S. Supreme Court to accept the decisions of the ICJ as binding despite the willingness
of the executive branch pushed the ICJ to address the U.S. courts directly, to avoid any doubts
as to which organs,within the state, were responsible for implementation. As Steve Charnovitz
showed, however, neither the federal nor the state courts accepted an obligation to ensure com-
pliance with the ICJ’s decisions in the absence of revision of state or federal legislation, and
neither the U.S. Congress nor the federal executive has acted purposefully to implement the
ICJ’s decisions.26 Charnovitz’s view of the U.S. Supreme Court in this regard highlights the
gulf between it and the Italian Court of Cassation: “Instead of assuring that U.S. treaty com-
mitments are adhered to, theU.S. SupremeCourt has glorified the supremacy of state laws vis-
a`-vis international obligations of the United States.”27
In the Russel case of 1979, the Italian Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the statute giving effect to Article 31(1) and (3) of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.28 It noted the customary nature of the rules on diplomatic immunity,
which had taken effect before theConstitution, and thus dispelled any doubts about their con-
stitutionality. The Constitutional Court also argued that these customs were necessary “to
ensure the fulfillment of the diplomatic mission, an essential institution of international law,”
butwarned that, “as regards international norms enjoying general recognition that entered into
force after theConstitution, themechanism of automatic incorporation . . . cannot in anyway
permit breach of the fundamental principles of our constitutional order.”29 This passage clar-
ifies that post-1948 customs cannot conflict with the so-called counterlimits, which function
23 Id., para. 137.
24 See Mirko Sossai, Are Italian Courts Directly Bound to Give Effect to the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment?,
21 IT. Y.B. INT’L L. 175, 178–79 (2011).
25 SeeFrancesco Francioni,From Utopia to Disenchantment: The Ill Fate of ‘Moderate Monism’ in the ICJ Judgment
on the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1125, 1129 (2012).
26 See Steve Charnovitz, Correcting America’s Continuing Failure to Comply with the Avena Judgment, 106 AJIL
572, 574 (2012).
27 Id. at 573.
28 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 UST 3227, 500 UNTS 95.
29 Corte cost., 18 giugno 1979, n. 48 (final para.), Gazzetta Ufficiale 1979, n. 175, available at http://www.
cortecostituzionale.it.
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as abarrier to the surrender of sovereignpowers to (or their exercise by) supranational and inter-
national bodies.
InAlbers, theCourt ofCassation opined that, since the custom envisaged inFerrini does not
in fact exist, no issue of constitutionality can arise (pp. 1205–06). This passage is elliptical, as
it fails to specify which statutory act was suspected of breaching the alleged custom. Perhaps
it refers to a conflict between the statutes enjoining Italian courts to decline jurisdiction30 and
theFerriniprinciple, elevated to a constitutional standardunderArticle 10of theConstitution.
Perhaps theCourtwas referring to another—more radical—conflict adumbrated by the plain-
tiffs, between immunity and constitutional counterlimits. If international jus cogens cannot
trump sovereign immunity, one could try to invoke domestic peremptory safeguards to escape
compliance with detestable international obligations, as in the Kadi case.31 As seen above in
Russel, however, pre-Constitution customs—including those on immunity—are seemingly
grandfathered into the Italian system and cannot undergo constitutional scrutiny, not even for
breach of the counterlimits. Cases are pending before the Court of Cassation that deal exactly
with this issue, which will grant an extra day (or year) in court to the Ferrini saga.32
FILIPPO FONTANELLI
University of Surrey
Sovereign immunity—provisional attachment of noncommercial property of a state—2004 UN Convention
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property—customary international law
NML CAPITAL LTD. v. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA. Nos. 11-10.450, 11-13.323, 10-25.938. At
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/.
French Cour de cassation, March 28, 2013.
In three cases decided on the same day, the French Court of Cassation held that the pro-
visional attachments of funds belonging to the Republic of Argentina by NML Capital Ltd.
(NML) were void on the ground of sovereign immunity from enforcement because the funds
were intended to finance state noncommercial activities and had not been subject to an express
waiver of immunity by Argentina.1 These cases are the first judicial application by the
Court of Cassation of the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States andTheir Property (2004UNConvention), which France signed on January 17, 2007,
and ratified on June 28, 2011.2
30 See L. n. 218/1995, supra note 11, Art. 11.
31 JoinedCases C-402/05 P&C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 ECR I-6351 (reported byMisˇa Zgorec-Roz˘ej
at 103 AJIL 305 (2009)).
32 Nn. 17962/2011 (L. Ferrini and heirs) and 12021/12 (O. Ferrini and heirs), cited in Giuseppe Cataldi,
The Implementation of Germany v. Italy, 2 ESIL REFLECTIONS, Jan. 24, 2013, at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/
node/281.
1 NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Mar. 28, 2013, at http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/ (to be reported
in the Bulletin d’information de la Cour de cassation). Translations from the French are by the authors.
2 Loi 2011-734 du 28 juin 2011 autorisant la ratification de la convention des Nations unies sur les immunite´s
juridictionnelles des E´tats et de leurs biens, J.O., June 29, 2011, p. 10953. For the 2004 UN Convention, see
GA Res. 59/38, annex (Dec. 2, 2004) (not yet in force).
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